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KELLEY V. R.G. INDUSTRIES, INC.:
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS TAKES
SHOT IN THE DARK AT SATURDAY
NIGHT SPECIALS
The primary purpose of tort law is to compensate aggrieved
individuals for harm incurred as a result of another's tortious acts.1
Under tort law principles, victims of gunshot wounds traditionally
have been able to seek recovery against their assailants.2 Although
a civil remedy is available, the fact that these assailants are often
judgment-proof criminals has caused many gunshot victims to in-
stitute proceedings, not against their assailants, but against the
manufacturer and marketer of the criminally misused weapon.'
Despite the emergence of these claims, efforts to recover under es-
tablished tort theories, such as the abnormally dangerous activity
doctrine 4 or strict products liability,5 have been generally unsuc-
I G. WILLIAMS & B. HEPPLE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 23 (1976). A distinction
between tort and criminal law arose from the primitive law, the former concerning interfer-
ences with the rights of individuals and the latter relating to offenses against the state. P.
KEETON & R. KEETON, TORTS 1 (2d ed. 1977). While tort law retains many remnants of the
criminal law as it existed in primitive times, such as retribution from the offending party,
the modern tort action emphasizes compensation of the aggrieved party. Id. at 2. To this
end, tort law seeks to establish when loss shall be shifted from one party to another, and if
so, how much. Id. The importance of this compensatory purpose is highlighted by the fact
that tort actions seeking compensatory damages have been given their own label--
reparation. G. WILLIAMS & B. HEPPLE, supra, at 26.
' See, e.g., Burge v. Forbes, 23 Ala. App. 67, 71, 120 So. 577, 579 (1928) (mere pointing
of pistol at another may be grounds for civil action), cert. denied, 219 Ala. 700, 121 So. 915
(1929); Carlton v. Geer, 138 Ga. App. 304, 305, 226 S.E.2d 99, 99 (1976) (firing at retreating
trespasser is basis for civil action); Singleton v. Townsend, 339 So. 2d 543, 545 (La. App.
1976) (firing at one who allegedly stole four dollars grounds for civil action); See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965). Section 21(1) of the Restatement provides: "(1)
An actor is subject to liability to another for assault if (a) he acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is thereby put in such imminent appre-
hension." Id.
' See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Harrington and
Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Riordan v. International Armament Corp.,
132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1965). The following criteria will
be considered in imposing liability under the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine, as
promulgated by section 520:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
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cessful.6 Recently, however, in Kelley v. R. G. Industries, Inc.,7 the
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and
(M extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dan-
gerous attributes.
Id. at § 520.
The abnormally dangerous activity doctrine originated in the case of Fletcher v. Ry-
lands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), af'd, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (1868). In
Rylands, a reservoir constructed on the defendant's property developed a leak which filled
up a coal mine shaft on the plaintiff's adjoining property. Id. at 265. The court held that:
[T]he person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and,
if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape.
Id. at 279-80. While this has been stated as the rule of Rylands, it has been suggested that a
better statement of the court's holding is that the defendant will be liable when he "dam-
ages another by a thing or activity inappropriate to the place where it is maintained." W.
PROSSER, The Principles of Rylands v. Fletcher, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF ToRTS
147 (1982). Currently, the Rylands case has been rejected in twelve U.S. jurisdictions and
accepted in eighteen. See id. at 152.
5 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides thatz
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
The rationale underlying section 402A is that by marketing a product, the seller has
undertaken a responsibility to the consuming public and that the public has the right to
expect the seller to stand behind his goods. Id. at § 402A comment c.
0 See Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984). In
Martin, the plaintiffs brought an action in damages for Larry Martin, who was shot and
killed. Id. at 1201. The action was not brought against the indigents who committed the
homicide, but against the manufacturer of the gun used in the commission of the crime. Id.
The plaintiff claimed that the manufacture and sale of handguns to the public were ul-
trahazardous activities giving rise to strict liability for any injuries incurred as a result of
the use of a handgun. Id. at 1201-02. The court rejected this claim, holding that the State of
Illinois had never imposed liability upon a non-negligent manufacturer of a product that
was not defective, and that to change such a policy would be inconsistent with Illinois' pub-
lic policy of regulating but not banning the possession of firearms. Id. at 1204. The Martin
court interpreted the Illinois Firearms and Ammunition Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 83-1
SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIALS
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the manufacturers and mar-
keters of Saturday Night Specials8 may be held strictly liable to
innocent victims who suffer gunshot injuries as a result of the
criminal misuse of such weapons."
In Kelley, the plaintiff, Olen J. Kelley, was shot in the chest
during an armed robbery of the grocery store where he was em-
ployed.10 The weapon used in the crime was a handgun manufac-
tured in West Germany by the defendant, Rohm Gesellschaft."
The handgun was shipped to this country in parts and subse-
quently assembled and marketed in this country by a second de-
fendant, R.G. Industries, Inc., a subsidiary of Rohm Gesellschaft 1 2
to 83-16.319 (1970), to be a legislative finding that handguns do not constitute unreasonably
dangerous products. See Martin, 743 F.2d at 1204.
In Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293
(1985), the court similarly rejected an attempt to impose liability upon a handgun manufac-
turer, concluding that it is not the manufacture or sale of a handgun that is ultrahazardous,
but its use. Id. at 1297. The Riordan court held that the imposition of liability upon the
manufacturer would constitute an extension of the ultrahazardous activity doctrine beyond
its "accepted meaning." Id. But see Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 204
(E.D. La. 1983)(sale of handguns to public constitutes ultrahazardous activity).
7 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
1 See id. at 144, 497 A.2d at 1153. The court noted that "Saturday Night Specials are
generally characterized by short barrels, light weight, easy concealabilty, low cost, use of
cheap quality materials, poor manufacture, innacuracy and unreliability." Id. at 145-46, 497
A.2d at 1153-54. The inexpensiveness of Saturday Night Specials makes them highly prone
to criminal use, and their poor quality makes them useless for most any other purpose. See
Hearings on S. 2507 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 109-10 (1971) (hereinafter S. 2507 Hearings).
The term "Saturday Night Special" originated in Detroit, where law enforcement offi-
cials noted the frequency with which inexpensive handguns were responsible for weekend
violence. Id; see also R. SHERIL, THE SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL 97 (1973) ("A cheerful
special name has been reserved for the low class gun that draws heavily on the emotions but
lightly on the purse."). While the term originally referred to inexpensive, poorly designed
weapons, the current definition includes virtually any foreign or domestic handgun used to
commit a crime. See R. SHERRILL, supra, at 99. A typical Saturday Night Special will be a
.22 or .25 caliber handgun, although even .38 caliber weapons may fall within the ambit of
the term if their quality is sufficiently poor. Id. Despite the fact that Saturday Night Spe-
cials are generally low caliber weapons, they may be more lethal than better quality, higher
caliber weapons due to the propensity of a bullet shot from a Saturday Night Special to
ricochet within the human body, rather than passing cleanly through it. Id. at 106. Addi-
tionally, these weapons often misfire, fire accidentally, backfire, are notoriously inaccurate
even at short distances, see S. 2507 Hearings, supra, at 109-10, may have a bullet jam
within the cylinder, or fire more than one bullet at a time due to the closeness of the cylin-
ders, possibly resulting in the fragmentation of the handgun. See IR SHERRILL, supra, at 106.
1 Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
10 Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1144.
11 Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1145.
12 Id.
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The plaintiff brought suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Maryland, setting forth two counts based on strict liabil-
ity.13 R.G. Industries, Inc. removed the case to the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, where the suit against
it was dismissed.14 Subsequently, the remaining defendant, Rohm
Gesellschaft, moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim,
arguing that the handgun was not defective and that it, as the
manufacturer, could not be held accountable for the criminal acts
of the plaintiff's assailant. 5 At a hearing on the motion to dismiss,
the district court, finding no controlling precedents under Mary-
land law, certified questions to the Maryland Court of Appeals. 6
Although the Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's traditional
strict liability claims,' 7 it did create a distinct new theory of strict
liability under which the manufacturers and marketers of Saturday
Night Specials may be held liable for criminal acts committed with
such weapons.'"
Writing for the court, Judge Eldridge found that the plaintiff's
first count, the abnormally dangerous activity claim, failed to sat-
isfy Maryland's threshold requirement that the activity be danger-
ous in relation to the property on which it occurs.1 9 The plaintiff's
unreasonably dangerous product claim was similarly rejected, due
13 Id. The plaintiff also set forth a third count based on negligence theory and a fourth
count based on loss of consortium. Id. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145. These counts were not
considered on appeal because they were not among the questions of law certified to the
Maryland Court of Appeals. See id. at 129-31, 497 A.2d at 1145-46.
14 Id. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446 (1982). The case against the
defendant R.G. Industries, Inc. was dismissed pursuant to stipulation of the parties. Kelley,
304 Md. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145.
1 Kelley, 304 Md. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145. At common law, the criminal acts of a third
party constitute a superseding cause that serves to relieve an alleged tortfeasor of liability
for harm caused by a third party. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
"6 Kelley, 304 Md. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145.
17 See id. at 132-39, 497 A.2d at 1146-50. See supra notes 4-5.
18 Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
19 Id. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1146-47. See Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138
(1969); Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 176 Md. 197, 4 A.2d 757 (1939); Kirby v. Hylton,
51 Md. App. 365, 443 A.2d 640 (1982). The rationale behind this requirement is that some
activities, like blasting, for example, would be ultrahazardous if conducted in a densely
populated area, but not ultrahazardous if conducted in a sparsely populated location. See
Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 202 (E.D. La. 1983). The court in Kelley
held that "[t]he dangers inherent in the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime...
bear no relation to any occupation or ownership of land." Kelley, 304 Md. at 133, 497 A.2d
at 1147. See also Note, Legal Limits of a Handgun Manufacturer's Liability for the Crimi-
nal Acts of Third Persons, 49 Mo. L. REv. 830, 844 (1984) (criticizing application of abnor-
mally dangerous activity doctrine to activities deemed inappropriate in all localities).
SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIALS
to the court's determination that the handgun was not defective
under either of the tests for defectiveness developed under com-
mon law.20 Notwithstanding the inapplicability of established prin-
ciples of strict liability, Judge Eldridge stated that the common
law's ability to adapt to modern circumstances enabled the courts
to impose a new theory of strict liability on the manufacturers and
marketers of Saturday Night Specials in consonance with what it
perceived to be the public policy goals of the State of Maryland.21
In support of its holding, the court examined federal gun control
law and legislative history,22 determining that Saturday Night Spe-
20 Kelley, 304 Md. at 134-39, 497 A.2d at 1147-50. The plaintiff's second strict liability
claim was based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A. The court concluded
that a properly functioning handgun was not defective and thus not within the scope of
section 402A. Kelley, 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149. In making this determination, the
Kelley court applied two tests for defectiveness. See id. at 135-39, 497 A.2d at 1148-50. The
first of these, the consumer expectations test, states that a product is defective if it is "dan-
gerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its charac-
teristics". RESTATEhMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A comment i (1965). In applying the con-
sumer expectations test, the Kelley court determined that a handgun manufacturer could
not be held strictly liable because a consumer should and generally does expect a handgun
to be dangerous. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 135-36, 497 A.2d at 1148.
The second test for defectiveness, the risk/benefit test, requires the defendant to prove
that the benefits of the defendant's design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in that
design. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-27, 573 P.2d 443, 452, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 234 (1978). The Kelley court determined that this test was inappropriate because it
should be applied only "when something goes wrong with product." Kelley 304 Md. at 138,
497 A.2d at 1149. Because the handgun in this case performed exactly as designed, the court
concluded that the manufacturer was not liable under this test. See id.
21 Kelley, 304 Md. at 140-41, 497 A.2d at 1151. The court observed that "the common
law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism-its ability to keep pace with the world
while constantly searching for just and fair solutions to pressing societal problems." Id. The
Court of Appeals relied on Maryland's Gun Control Law, MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27, §§ 36B-
36G (1985), for a declaration of state policy. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 141-42, 497 A.2d at
1150-51. Maryland's Gun Control Law provides:
(i) There has, in recent years, been an alarming increase in the number of violent
crimes perpetrated in Maryland, and a high percentage of those crimes involve
the use of handguns;
(ii) The result has been a substantial increase in the number of persons killed or
injured which is traceable, in large part, to the carrying of handguns on the
streets and public ways by persons inclined to use them in criminal activity;
(iii) The laws currently in force have not been effective in curbing the more fre-
quent use of handguns in perpetrating crime; and
(iv) Further regulations on the wearing, carrying, and transporting of handguns
are necessary to preserve the peace and tranquility of the State and to protect
the rights and liberties of its citizens.
MD. ANN.CODE art. 27, § 36B(a) (1985).
22 See Kelley, 304 Md. at 147-53, 497 A.2d at 1154-57.
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cials had little or no legitimate purpose in society, and that the
manufacturers and marketers of Saturday Night Specials should
reasonably foresee that the chief use of their product is criminal
activity.13
The Kelley court's decision conceivably could have favorable
ramifications for both law enforcement officials and society in gen-
eral.2 4 It is suggested, however, that in an effort to judicially re-
solve an issue that has long plagued legislatures,25 the Kelley court
has developed a legal theory without foundation in the common
law, and has created law that will not necessarily serve to decrease
criminal activity. This Comment will assert that the decision in
Kelley is inconsistent with established strict liability principles,
and will analyze possible adverse effects of the decision. This Com-
ment will suggest that the court of appeals' decision constitutes
undesirable judicial activism, and that legislative enactments
would best fulfill the demands of public policy and meet the ends
23 Id. at 156, 497 A.2d at 1159. While the common law traditionally insulated an alleged
tortfeasor from liability for the harm caused by the criminal acts of a third party, see supra
note 15, the Kelley court's conclusion that the criminal use of a handgun was foreseeable is
not without legal foundation. In LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985 (5th
Cir. 1980), the plaintiffs, highly intoxicated and driving at speeds in excess of 100 miles per
hour, sued Goodyear for injuries resulting from an accident which occurred when the tread
of the Goodyear tires separated from the body of the tire. Id. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that while the operation of an automobile at illegal speeds
is not a "normal use" in the sense that it is routine or intended, it is a normal use in the
parlance of products liability law because "normal use" is a term of art encompassing "all
reasonably foreseeable uses of a product." Id. at 989 (emphasis added).
Citing LeBouef, the district court in Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192
(E.D. La. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985), made
the following somewhat strained analogy: "[I]f car manufacturers must reasonably expect
purchasers of their products to speed periodically, then surely handgun manufacturers must
reasonably expect purchasers of their products to kill periodically." Richman, 571 F. Supp.
at 197. It is asserted that this analogy is seriously flawed, and therefore the use of this
analogy in declaring that murder by handgun is a "normal use" is similarly flawed. The
ethical and societal implication of speeding cannot be realistically compared with a shoot-
ing. The criminal law recognizes as much by distinguishing between, for example, vehicular
homicide and criminal homicide.
24 See e.g., Kennedy, The Handgun Crime Control Act of 1981, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 1,
(1982) (banning sale of Saturday Night Specials necessary to lower crime); Zimring, Is Gun
Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killing?, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 721, (1968) (significant num-
ber of homicides are caused by possession of guns during otherwise mild disorderly con-
duct). But see Santarelli & Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take
Products Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 482-83 (1983) (persons with criminal
intent able to arm themselves notwithstanding any restrictions).
25 See Cook, The "Saturday Night Special": An Assessment of Alternative Definitions
from a Policy Perspective, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1735, 1736 n.5 (1981) (listing of
unenacted handgun control bills).
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of gun control.
COMMON LAW RECOVERY WITHOUT COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES
Conspicuously absent from the Kelley court's decision are
common law tort principles upon which the decision may be logi-
cally founded.2 6 The court of appeals contradicts existing tort prin-
ciples by requiring neither that the handgun be defective,2 7 nor
that its usage be dangerous in relation to the property on which it
is used.2' Further, the court does not specify that there be no crim-
inal activity which would serve to act as a superseding cause.29 It is
asserted that by requiring only that the handgun be a Saturday
Night Special, the Kelley decision provides no incentive for careful
design, manufacture, or marketing,30 but serves only as an ill-con-
ceived and ineffectual attempt to judicially ban the production of
Saturday Night Specials. 1
26 See Kelley, 304 Md. at 141, 497 A.2d at 1151. The court rejected existing common
law theories of recovery, id. at 134-39, 497 A.2d at 1146-50, and created a new theory of
strict liability based upon public policy factors. See id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
27 Id. at 135-39, 497 A.2d at 1148-50. The Kelley court expressly rejected the notion
that a properly functioning handgun is defective merely because it is dangerous. Id. A defect
is required for strict liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), supra
note 5.
20 Kelley, 304 Md. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147. The court imposed liability despite the fact
that it determined that "[t]he dangers inherent in the use of a handgun in the commission
of a crime. . . bear no relation to any occupation or ownership of land." Id; see supra note
4.
2' Kelley, 304 Md. at 156-57, 497 A.2d at 1159. The court overcame the common law
superseding cause doctrine, discussed supra note 15, by ruling that "the manufacturer or
marketer of a Saturday Night Special knows or ought to know that the chief use of the
product is for criminal activity." Id. at 156-57, 497 A.2d at 1159; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
30 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965). The rationale be-
hind strict liability is that it will force sellers to stand behind their goods and presumably
provide them with an incentive to use care in their design and manufacture. See id.
2, Since the manufacturer is not relieved of liability by producing a better Saturday
Night Special, he has no incentive to do so. If a manufacturer chooses to avoid liability
completely, he must completely eliminate production of handguns which fall within this
category. It is asserted that in this respect the Kelley decision constitutes a judicially im-
posed ban on production that is not within the scope of a court's authority. See Bojorquez v.
House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1976). In Bojorquez, the plain-
tiff's child was hit in the eye by a projectile fired from a slingshot that was retailed and
distributed by the defendant. See id. at 932, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 484. The court refused to hold
the defendant strictly liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, reasoning that such a
result would be tantamount to the banning of production by "judicial fiat." See id. at 933,
133 Cal. Rptr. at 484. The court held that "[s]uch a limitation is within the purview of the
legislature, not the judiciary." Id. at 133 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
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Although the Kelley decision dramatically alters the rights and du-
ties of Saturday Night Special manufacturers and marketers, 32 its
inconsistency with existing tort law could be countenanced if credi-
ble evidence indicates that the decision would effectuate Maryland
public policy. No such evidence in fact exists.33
ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS OF MANUFACTURER LIABILITY
To the extent that it forces Saturday Night Special manufac-
turers and marketers to obtain insurance or expend money to sat-
isfy gunshot victims' claims, the Kelley decision increases manu-
facturing and marketing costs, thereby increasing the price paid by
consumers.3 4 Proponents of the imposition of strict liability argue
that increased prices will lead to lower demand for handguns, and
will eventually decrease criminal activity. 5 However, this argu-
32 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. Under Maryland law, when the reso-
lution of an issue would work a substantial change in established rights and duties, the
matter is best left for the legislature to resolve. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278
Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955, (1976). In Phipps, the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland issued a certified question to the Maryland Court of Appeals as to whether the
state of Maryland recognized section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 338,
363 A.2d at 955. The court rejected the defendant's claim that the adoption of section 402A
would constitute such a radical change in the duties of manufacturers that it was necessarily
a matter for the legislature, and noted that strict liability in tort is closely related to tradi-
tional negligence theory, an area rightfully within the domain of the judiciary. Id. at 350-51,
363 A.2d at 962. It is suggested that the Kelley decision does not rest on a solid legal foun-
dation, unlike Phipps. Section 402A constitutes a well-scrutinized doctrine that has been
accepted by nearly every state in the union. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md.
337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Note, Torts-Products Liability-Theory of Strict Tort Liability
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, 6 BALT. L. REv. 295, 295 n.3, n.4 (1977) (held
applicable in Maryland when complaint alleged that defendant manufactured and placed on
the market an automobile in a defective condition not reasonably safe for its intended use).
However, while commentators have argued for the adoption of liability based on existing
theories of tort liability, see Note, Manufacturer's Liability to Victims of Handgun Crimes,
10 N. Ky. L. REv. 41 (1982), it seems that no commentators have proposed the adoption of
liability based on whether a handgun qualifies as a Saturday Night Special.
3 See Zimring, Two New Books on Guns, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 954, 954 (1984). Gun control
has been described as an "ideologically dominated and emotionally charged" issue. See id.
For this reason, many studies have been criticized as result oriented, or questioned because
of their methodology. See id. at 966. For a discussion of the conflicting opinions concerning
the efficacy of handgun control, see supra note 24.
"' See Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Handgun Injuries: An Economic
Analysis, 73 GEo. L.J. 1437 (1985). It has been suggested that the price of handguns under a
no liability rule is artificially low, since it does not reflect the handgun's true costs to soci-
ety. Id. at 1438. One commentator argues that only when the price of a handgun includes
the cost of compensating gunshot victims for their wounds will the price reflect its true cost
to society. See id. at 1462.
11 See id. at 1459. Presumably, purchasers would be less inclined to buy at a higher
SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIALS
ment relies upon the disputable assumption that the demand for
handguns is elastic, or responsive to price changes.36 A review of
past attempts to regulate handguns suggests that demand for these
weapons is inelastic; consequently, if criminals seek to obtain
handguns, they will not be influenced by an increase in cost.3 7
Analogously, efforts to control alcohol production during Prohibi-
tion and drug consumption today have failed because society sim-
ply would not permit itself to be regulated. 8 In the case of hand-
guns, it is possible that increased costs will not reduce demand,
but will instead cause criminals to seek out alternative methods of
obtaining them, presumably by stealing either the guns themselves
or the money necessary to buy them. 9 It is conceivable, therefore,
that the imposition of liability upon handgun manufacturers and
marketers, which will cause a corresponding cost increase to pur-
chasers, may encourage criminal activity rather than reduce it.
Even if the Kelley decision succeeds in decreasing the demand
for Saturday Night Specials, it is asserted that its effect on hand-
gun related criminal activity would be insignificant due to the fact
price, thus causing a decrease in demand and eventually, a decrease in production. See id.;
but see infra note 37. For a review of supply and demand and the influence of increased
costs, see generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (11th ed. 1980). Even if increased costs re-
sulted in a decrease in demand, commentators have questioned whether a reduction in the
number of handguns available would effectively reduce criminal activity. See supra note 24.
36 See P. SOLMON, ECONOMics 407 (1980). "Elasticity of Demand is the term used to
describe the responsiveness (in percentage terms) of the quantity demanded to changes in
price." See id. at 408. Demand for a product is said to be elastic if a certain percentage
change in that product's price creates a larger percentage change in the quantity of the good
demanded. Id. If the percentage change in price results in a smaller percentage change in
the quantity of the product demanded, the demand for that product is said to be inelastic.
Id. Typically, demand is elastic, or responsive to price changes, when substitutes for the
product exist. Id. at 414-16. For example, if the cost of one brand of soft drink increases, the
demand for that beverage will decrease if the prices of the other brands remain the same.
Id. However, for products where no suitable alternatives exist, such as insulin or electricity,
an increase in price will probably have a small effect on demand. Id.
1 Santarelli & Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take Prod-
ucts Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 482-83 (1983). Regardless of how much
prices may rise, demand for handguns will not be suppressed, and this demand will create
its own supply. See id. at 483. See also Murray, Handguns, Gun Control Laws and Fire-
arms Violence, 23 Soc. PROBS. 81, 90 (1975) (gun control legislation is "totally irrelevant to
its purpose").
" See Note, A Farewell to Arms?-An Analysis of Texas Handgun Control Law, 13 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 601, 614-18 (1982). Government failure to adequately control the production of
alcohol during Prohibition and the present day consumption of drugs has led one commen-
tator to conclude that "those who wish to possess an illegal item will find some means of
doing so." Id. at 618.
31 See id.
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that liability would be unavailable against manufacturers and mar-
keters who do not deal in Saturday Night Specials,40 and manufac-
turers and marketers of handguns sold before issuance of the
court's decision. 41 These facts, combined with the possibility that a
Saturday Night Special manufacturer may consciously avoid liabil-
ity by merely producing a weapon that does not meet the Saturday
Night Special prototype, such as a cheap handgun with a longer
barrel, suggest that because so many handguns exist outside the
scope of the court's ruling, Kelley will be rendered virtually inef-
fective. Finally, to the extent that it relieves criminals from civil
liability in favor of imposing liability upon a lawful business, the
Kelley decision serves to distort general notions of justice and fair-
ness while creating the impression that the judiciary considers it-
self unable to adequately punish the perpetrators of criminal
acts.42
ADVANTAGES OF LEGISLATION
It is submitted that in the area of handgun control, legislation
constitutes a more effective alternative than judicial intervention.43
40 See Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
" See id. at 161-62, 497 A.2d at 1161-62. Ordinarily, the court's decision would apply to
any cause of action arising after its decision. See id. at 161, 497 A.2d at 1162. The Kelley
court refused to apply its decision in such a far-reaching fashion, however, stating that there
might "be an element of unfairness in applying [the Kelley decision] to... manufacturers
and marketers of handguns [who] ... have had little reason to anticipate that their actions
might result in tort liability." Id. The court held that its decision would apply unless the
defendant is able to show that the sale of the Saturday Night Special occurred before the
Kelley decision. See id. The burden of proving the date of sale was placed upon the defend-
ant manufacturer or marketer, on the ground that they are best able to offer the necessary
evidence. See id. at 162 n.31, 497 A.2d at 1162 n.31.
42 Cf. Santarelli & Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take
Products Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 507 (1983) (attachment of liability
tantamount to subsidation of criminal misdeeds); Note, Handguns and Products Liability,
97 HARV. L. Rav. 1912, 1920 n.41 (1984) (imposition of liability would spread the costs of
illegal activities by forcing "guiltless purchasers to subsidize the activities of the guilty").
One commentator argues that "[r]estitution for criminal acts should come from the criminal
responsible for the damages, not a businessman engaged in a lawful exercise." Santarelli &
Calio, supra, at 507. See also Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co., 659 P.2d 1236, 1240 (Alaska
1983) (extending liability to handgun manufacturers runs counter to basic values of criminal
justice system and would erode societal norms).
'3 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d
312 (1970). In discussing whether it should make a determination on an issue of public
concern, the New York State Court of Appeals stated:
A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights of the parties
before it. Its decision of private controversies may sometimes greatly affect public
issues. Large questions of law are often resolved by the manner in which private
SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIALS
Unlike the Kelley court, it is submitted that a legislature need not
feel constrained to limit the scope of its regulation only to Satur-
day Night Specials, and need not hesitate to regulate handguns
sold prior to the creation of the regulation. If a legislature deter-
mined that public policy required the regulation of handguns, it
would have before it a much wider variety of methods and options,
including the creation of a regulatory agency, stricter licensing re-
quirements and criminalization of handgun possession.44 Further-
more, it is suggested that a legislative body is better able to deter-
mine if public policy demands handgun regulation.
While the past failure of legislatures to enact handgun control
laws has been characterized as one of the ills engendered by special
interest groups such as the National Rifle Association, it is not
clear that, in relation to regulation of Saturday Night Specials,
special interest groups are applying any pressure at all.45 It is sug-
litigation is decided. But this is normally an incident to the court's main function
to settle controversy. It is a rare exercise of judicial power to use a decision in
private litigation as a purposeful mechanism to achieve direct public objectives
greatly beyond the rights and interest before the court.
Id. at 222, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314-15.
44 See, S. 974, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 CONG. REc. 3806-16 (1981). The unpassed
Handgun Crime Control Act of 1981 (the "Act") provides an example of legislatively im-
posed regulation. See id. The Act prohibited the manufacture, sale, and importation of
weapons designated as Saturday Night Specials. Id. at 3809-14. It proposed a twenty-one
day waiting period prior to the purchase of any handgun so that weapons dealers could
ascertain with law enforcement that a prospective purchaser was not a felon. Id. at 3811.
Manufacturers were required to keep records of all handgun sales, id. at 3811-12, and failure
to report the theft or loss of a handgun later used in a crime was a felony. Id. at 3810.
Additionally, had it been passed, the Act would have provided for a mandatory minimum
jail sentence of up to five years for the use or possession of a handgun during the commis-
sion of a felony. Id. at 3813. See generally Kennedy, The Handgun Crime Control Act of
1981, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 1 (1982)(discussion by Senator Edward Kennedy of 1981 Act, its
requirements, and goals).
4" See Kelley, 304 Md. at 146 n.10, 497 A.2d at 1154 n.10. The court noted that Max-
well Rich, Executive Vice President of the National Rifle Association (NRA), testified dur-
ing Senate hearings that Saturday Night Specials were not permitted to be advertised in the
NRA's official journal, the American Rifleman. Id. Mr. Rich stated: "Our reason is that they
have no sporting purpose, they are frequently poorly made, and they do not represent value
received to any purchaser." S. 2507 Hearings, supra note 8, at 109-10 (1971). In addition,
the legislative process contains built-in safeguards sufficient to ensure that the effect of spe-
cial interest groups does not undermine the democratic nature of our society by placing the
interest of the few before the many. See N. ORNSTEIN & S. ELDER, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBY-
ING AND POLICYING 99-114 (1978). In fact, circumvention of special interest groups through
persistent judicial intervention would, in effect, eliminate one part of the legislative process.
See D. HALL, COOPERATIVE LOBBYING-THE POWER OF PRESSURE xi (1970). "[T]he process of
exerting influence has itself become institutionalized: government expects to be 'pressured'
and in fact takes considerable pains to see that at least some channels are always open as
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gested that the inability of legislatures to enact handgun control
legislation is not a failure at all, but a positive manifestation of the
wishes of the public as expressed through their elected officials 46
and their private lobbies.4 7
CONCLUSION
In an attempt to resolve a social problem in accordance with
public policy, the Kelley court has developed a theory of strict lia-
bility without foundation in the common law. While the ultimate
effects are difficult to determine, it is clear that the Kelley court's
attempt at regulation via the imposition of strict liability upon the
manufacturers and marketers of Saturday Night Specials is of du-
bious merit in the short-run, is not the most efficient manner of
handgun control, and does not reflect public opinion concerning
handgun control. It is urged that if courts are to remain truly loyal
to public policy, they must recognize their limitations and avoid
abortive attempts at the regulation of handguns.
Michael A. Knoerzer
access routes for significant interests." Id.
48 See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1, 3. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, co-author of the
unenacted Kennedy-Rodino Handgun Control Act of 1981, expressed the opinion that the
major obstacles to enactment of a handgun control bill are adverse public opinion and disa-
greement among legislators. Id.
47 G. HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS 1-3 (1967). Today, voters no
longer look immediately to their respective political parties for support for their views and
convictions. Id. at 3. Instead, voters look to an organized group that shares the same ideas,
relying on it to best represent these views before the legislature. Id.
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